Conventional warfare is no longer the convention.
Since the turn of the 21st century, strategic threats to the security of the United States have changed considerably, requiring the U.S. military to rapidly change operational strategy and develop unconventional warfighting capabilities. This essay explores the ways and the extent to which Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001-2014) has shaped the U.S. Military’s usage of the Indirect approach and Special Operations Forces. During the past 16 years, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have spearheaded the advance towards the acquisition of 21st century combat ready assets. As U.S. involvement in asymmetric engagements has become more frequent, the adaptability of SOF has allowed for the scope of missions to evolve in order to include innovative operational techniques. Primarily, the U.S. has shifted strategic focus towards low-intensity conflict that relies on SOF partnerships with regional entities, which has come to be known as the Indirect approach.
The U.S. first utilized SOF during the Second World War, in which knife-armed Underwater Demolitions Teams augmented conventional forces during beachhead invasions in the Pacific Theater (Rottman, 47). However, SOF have seen a massive expansion of strategic capabilities since their first deployments in the 1940’s, and have adapted in order to conduct critical missions as political and operational climates constantly change. SOF are defined loosely by the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as “Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations” (Department of Defense). “Special Operations” refer to any unconventional military engagement in which the usage of solely conventional forces would be detrimental to the strategic outcome of the engagement. Most notably, the emergence of non-state actors (unconventional entities) as a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests have led to wider array SOF responsibilities, requiring increased focus upon Indirect special operations. Specifically, the bulk of this distinct transition occurred during the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF-A).
OEF-A was a U.S. military campaign responding to the September 11th, 2001 attacks carried out by the Islamic terrorist group, al-Qaeda. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent military action taken against al-Qaeda and the Taliban government has profoundly influenced the nature of modern warfare. Historically, combat missions in Afghanistan have required unconventional strategic and tactical approaches due to geographic, cultural, and political complexities. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), both operationally disastrous for the invading countries, highlight the difficulties faced during military operations in the vast, mountainous provinces of Afghanistan. A conventional strategic approach to warfare in the region yields alienation of tribal factions and inability to sustain control over significant territory, as illustrated during the Soviet-Afghan War, specifically within the first phase of Soviet invasion and occupation (1979-80). Soviet forces utilized World War II era invasion techniques, attempting to overrun Sunni Mujahideen forces with sheer tactical force, initially deploying over 100,000 personnel (Amstutz). Although total Soviet forces (620,000) greatly outnumbered the Mujahideen insurgency (Est. 200,000-250,000), Soviet leadership neglected to implement an effective occupying strategy, therefore alienating tribal leaders and fueling increased dissent by oppressed Sunni Muslims, which in turn led to increased Mujahideen recruitment (Rischard). In addition, lack of preparedness in dealing with the rugged, alpine terrain-compounded by the unconventional guerrilla tactics employed by Mujahideen combatants-left Soviet forces hard-pressed to find operational success.
As an anomaly throughout the history of warfare, Afghanistan presented a significant strategic challenge to the U.S. as well in wake of the September 11th, 2001 attacks. In the weeks following, the U.S. began aerial operations that signaled the start Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In order to accomplish overall mission objectives, a strategy of implementing a low profile, unconventional and Indirect approach, supplemented by frequent air strikes, was deemed appropriate (Biddle, pp. 31–46). This predominantly Indirect method of warfighting, applied to OEF-A, is commonly referred as the “Afghan Model.” Asymmetrical warfare, defined as “Warfare in which opposing groups or nations have unequal military resources, and the weaker opponent uses unconventional weapons and tactics, as terrorism, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy” (Mansbach, 568) often requires alternative tactical approaches to accomplish overall strategic objectives. Al-Qaeda and Taliban combatants in Afghanistan presented challenges to conventional invasion and occupying methods due to their ability to blend with local populations and utilize the geographic rarities of the environment. In addition, the tribal factionalism within Afghan provinces caused difficulty in developing and maintaining partnerships with local populations. It was decided that traditional military or political posturing would not win hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Rather, a more direct and personal level of connection between the Afghan population and U.S. forces was required for strategic success.
The Indirect Approach
“Winning Hearts and Minds” became the mantra for Afghanistan. Such a unique mentality was required to avoid the mistakes of previous military engagements within the country. Yet, while this strategy was relatively simple to develop, it was much more difficult to implement tactically. The U.S. faced major roadblocks in executing missions aligned with strategic goals as the effectuation of strategy in Afghanistan required significant innovation to transform capabilities to engage non-state actors while maintaining local tribal alliances. These specific requirements called for adaptable and specialized assets, and so began a reliance on SOF to execute Indirect operations in Afghanistan. SOF have been developed to manage any type of unconventional combat where conventional forces would be rendered largely ineffectual in achieving tactical or strategic objectives. Therefore, SOF became the prime candidates for dealing with asymmetrical and unconventional conflict, as was faced during OEF-A due to the nature of the insurgency. This “Afghan Model,” which heavily relies on SOF-led capability, sensitive to local communities, has become synonymous with the “Indirect approach” (Biddle, pp. 161–176).
Not only have the terms become associated, but OEF-A has also played a significant role in the SOF’s development of the Indirect approach. The Indirect approach is the implementation a strategic initiative that “empower(s) host nation forces, provide(s) appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engage(s) key populations” in order to achieve strategic success (Bucci). It contrasts the Direct approach, which utilizes “technologically-enabled small-unit precision lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated on a digitally-networked battlefield” (Bucci). Based upon the shortfalls of previous 20th century operations in Afghanistan, it appears that there are three key strategic elements that lead towards general campaign success in the country, that are often neglected by a Direct approach: tactical ability to operate efficiently in adverse terrain, understanding of tribal divides within the region and the preservation of ties to local allies. As the Indirect approach focuses on community relations paired with cultural awareness of tribal populations, it presented itself as the most logical and operationally viable model for OEF-A. The following implementation would build upon itself, developing a 21st century method of approaching conflict with regional peace as an end goal.
Implementation Phase
The recognition of need for the support from localized Afghan populations affected combat tactics from the first days of the war. OEF-A began the night of October 7th, 2001, with U.K and U.S. airstrikes targeting and neutralizing critical Taliban communications and defense infrastructure (Biddle, pp. 31–46). Initially, then-commanding General of Central Command (CENTCOM), Tommy Franks, recommended the insertion of a 60,000 personnel invasion force after a six-month preparation period. The plan was swiftly rejected by President George W. Bush and Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, who instead called for an immediate response to the recent attacks on U.S. soil. Franks redrafted the plan–hoping to avoid the mistakes of past Russian and British invasions–this time focused on the neutralization of Taliban strongholds using strategic air strikes and a number of elite SOF Operators working in conjunction with local resistance militias (Zimmerman). By November, U.S. SOF, with assistance from the Afghan Northern Alliance, were able to take the key Balkh province city of Mazar-i-Sharaf (Fisk).
In order to win the favor of local populations after the intense combat, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and Tactical Psychological Operations Teams from the 4th Psychological Operations Group were deployed to further to develop favorable perceptions of U.S. SOF that were occupying the city (Neville). By employing direct tactical action, followed by diplomatic operations and humanitarian aid, the U.S. led coalition was able to nullify Taliban power in Northern Afghanistan. Soon afterwards, Kabul and Kunduz fell in similar manner, leaving only the Taliban’s southern-most stronghold, Kandahar. Subsequent battles led to the defeat of Taliban forces in the region and an end to overall Taliban governmental control in Afghanistan (O’Hanlan, pp. 47–63). The strategic Indirect approach had proven itself tactically applicable. However, more challenges were to be overcome in order to achieve a successful implementation of the “Afghan Model.” The U.S. experience during Operation Anaconda–which took place in the Shahi-Kot Valley of southeastern Afghanistan (March 1-18, 2002)–further demonstrated the unusual nature of warfighting methods employed by al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, requiring additional modification to U.S. strategy (Tanner, pp. 317).
The Shahi-Kot Valley is notoriously treacherous, with a mean altitude of 2,700 meters (Zimmerman). The complexity of the terrain made the valley an ideal redoubt for al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, which utilized natural rock features to evade detection by U.S. tracking and surveillance assets. SOF were therefore required to visually identify combatant targets, typically pinpointing Taliban insurgents only after having received fire from concealed positions. This reversion to close quarters conflict called for U.S. forces with superior close-quarters combat skills, therefore increasing the reliance upon SOF Units to carry out missions, even the most routine patrols, in rural Afghanistan. In addition, SOF were specially trained to operate in geographically unconventional and rugged areas, such as the Eastern-most mountainous provinces of Afghanistan. By employing SOF forces specifically trained to conduct missions in unfavorable conditions and atypical terrain, as opposed to attempting to transport large numbers of lesser-prepared conventional forces to the combat zone, the U.S. took major steps toward implementing an effective Indirect strategy in Afghanistan (Gonzalez, pp. 21–22).
After the initial phase (2001-02) of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and Taliban operations were scaled back as most affiliates were forced into hiding by successful U.S. deposition of the Taliban government. However, after the summer of 2002, the remaining Taliban base began mass recruitment of Pashtun tribal peoples in Eastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan in an attempt to prepare for a resumption of operations. The majority of new combatants were recruited at madrassas, traditionally religious educational institutions dedicated to the teachings of Islam. Students were first radicalized and then sent to training small camps along the Pakistani border, where they were introduced to fundamentalist Islamic doctrine and trained to operate using basic guerilla combat tactics. These recruitment efforts by al-Qaeda and Taliban came to fruition in early 2006, as urban centers saw an uptick in the usage of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the implementation of suicide bombings to inspire fear in local populations. The increased Taliban insurgency resulted in the development of the multinational NATO led coalition, known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), designed to augment U.S. capabilities. Together, U.S. forces and the ISAF developed programs that focused on training Afghan troops and local police to combat Taliban advances (Robinson, pp. 110–122).
Building Partnerships
However, the U.S. was cautious about activity in tribal areas, as it once again engaged in direct combat operations targeting Taliban insurgents, fearing either localized tribal cooperation with Taliban or development of local militias. While there was considerable debate as to the degree to which tribal entities should play a role in combat or intelligence operations, most in the military agreed that strategic partnerships with tribes should be maintained. Most critical to objective success was the support of Pashtun tribal leaders, and to the benefit of U.S. and ISAF coalition forces, Pashtun tribes largely rejected the Taliban’s advances in their territories. Pashtuns follow Pashtunwali, an ancient code of honor and principle that finds itself at odds with the Taliban interpretation of Sharia law (Bruno). Therefore, most jirgas (tribal councils) declared the local community opposed to any kind of Taliban control, and enforced these decisions through the arbakai (tribal defense forces).
U.S. SOF typically led these tribal interactions, utilizing language skills and creating friendships through tribal social convention. In fact, many SOF operators grew facial hair to better blend with local populations, in an attempt to put tribal leaders at ease during interactions. These same operators often sat for tea, speaking in Southern Pashto with locals. For instance, in 2010, Green Beret initiatives backed by General David Petraeus led to the development of Afghan Local Police (ALP) units, facilitated by the U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). Through repeated personal interaction with jirgas, utilizing learned techniques from time spent in tribal areas, Green Beret operators were able to convince khels (village communities) to partner with U.S. SOF to achieve a common objective (Odierno). ALP units, trained by U.S. SOF, provided crucial defense against Taliban insurgency within many rural localities, largely removing the burden from U.S. SOF or other ISAF forces. By “winning hearts and minds” of tribal Afghanistan, U.S. forces enabled persons living in rural regions to assume responsibility for day-to-day security and the development of anti-Taliban culture within the villages. In this instance, the use of the Indirect approach by SOF resulted in regional autonomy of populations that helped to accomplished significant strategic objectives (Dickson).
Green Berets meeting with local Afghan leaders. Photo Courtesy of U.S. ARMY
Just as crucial to the implementation of this approach was the preservation of strategic regional partnerships. Long-term cultivation of strategic civilian partnership typically calls for humanitarian support to the local populations, especially those directly affected by conflict. This humanitarian support could include medical care, the provision of safe water sources or reliable meals for inhabitants of the occupied area. Humanitarian support for locals during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations typically leads to improved trust between local populations and occupying COIN forces. As the general mission statement in Afghanistan expanded to “improve the prospect for peace and stability for the Afghan people and the world” (Katzman), a focus on the provision of emergency relief and humanitarian aide became necessary to stabilize significant parts of the country, as the well-being of the population was now the primary objective. SOF became the delivery mechanism for much of ISAF coalition’s aide to rural communities, as insurgents still posed a major threat in more remote areas, primarily in the South and Southwest (i.e Helmand, Nimroz, Kandahar). Operationally, U.S. SOF provided security and often transported medical supplies and essential food items in the most dangerous provinces (Human Rights Watch). The proven dedication of aid to the inhabitants of rural Afghanistan detracted from Taliban ability to recruit from any of these localities, swaying the population’s support for U.S. involvement. The successes in the SOFs’ implementation of the Indirect approach cemented SOF as a primary tool in the U.S. military’s problem solving arsenal.
Current Implementation: Operation Inherent Resolve
Due to overall success of the tactical implementation of the Indirect approach by SOF during the sustained warfare, the “Afghan” strategic framework is considered a viable model for other post OEF-A conflicts. Recently, threats by the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) to regional stability in the Middle East have led to an increase in U.S. presence in Iraq and Syria following the conclusion of OEF-A in 2014. The acquisition of an enclave by ISIL raises concerns for U.S. allies in the Middle East and by extension, implicates the U.S. in any territorial conflict. Like the Taliban, ISIL possesses extremist Islamic beliefs and rules over occupied territories with radical interpretation of Sharia Law. In a recent interview, Former Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan (2009-2010), Stanley A. McChrystal, suggests that “ISIL must be contained for the moment and ultimately destroyed over time, but most importantly the region needs a narrative that is compelling and credible to the populations. That narrative must include a vision of what the region will look like in 25 years” (Miklaucic), echoing lessons learned during OEF-A. As opposed to taking direct and overwhelming action against ISIL, attempting to eradicate its presence, McChrystal suggests developing a sound strategy for regional stability in the future, before any direct military action against ISIL is taken.
However, operations against ISIL are already beginning to take shape, and are given the official title of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Since 2014, the OIR Combined Joint Task Force has led a heavy aerial bombardment of ISIL strongholds in Iraq and Syria, specifically targeting ISIL’s leadership throughout the countries. Intelligence regarding ISIL leadership has been collected by U.S. SOF advisors deployed to work together with the Iraqi Army, Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurdish YPG on the ground. Approximately 300 advisors are deployed in Syria, while 100 are deployed in Iraq to provide physical training and development of operational capability for Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurdish YPG respectively (Bergen). This training allows the national militias to begin the push back against ISIL, just as similar Green Beret training allowed the ALP in Afghanistan to protect tribal areas from Taliban threats. Additionally, in adhering to key aspects of the Indirect approach, U.S. forces have avidly pursued the provision of humanitarian aid to Syrians and Iraqis. Most notably, in 2014, the U.S. and its coalition partners began an operation in which meals and drinking water were airdropped to some 30,000 Yazidi refugees stranded in the Sinjar mountains (U.S. Department of Defense) of Iraq. So far, the bulk of U.S. humanitarian operations in Syria and Iraq have been food emergency related, responding to risk of starvation or drought. These measures are intended to work towards the long-term stabilization of the regional populations as opposed to rapid reclamation of ISIL territory. By doing so, the U.S. ultimately aims to reduce the chances of reinvigorating anti-western sentiments following the expulsion of ISIL from major urban strongholds. These unclassified components of the campaign alone indicate that parts of the Indirect approach are being used to engage more conscientiously in Operation Inherent Resolve.
America’s longest war has done more than define an era of policy; it has gone on to drive profound change in the way that the U.S. military approaches conflict. In the face of new threats, the U.S. was forced to develop innovative solutions that went beyond tactical military strength. So the U.S, after turning to its most highly trained personnel, discovered that strategic success would not be found within the U.S. military but instead within the Afghan population. The historically unconventional nature of combat in Afghanistan is inextricably tied to the dynamics of the Afghan people and Pashtun Tribes. This shift towards a more civilian conscious–or even civilian focused–conflict has challenged the status quo for large-scale engagements such as OEF-A.
Through direct tactical usage of SOF–paired with Indirect operations–three major objectives were achieved. Firstly, SOF were able to acclimate to the diverse and challenging terrain of Afghanistan, something that other conventional forces were historically challenged by due to a lack of specialized training. Secondly, through personal diplomacy and an understanding of Pashtun culture, SOF operators were able to gain tribal support and help the Pashtun localities to develop self-sufficient defense networks. Lastly, these relationships were maintained largely as a result of the U.S. humanitarian commitment to Afghan citizens in the wake violence by the Taliban. The achievement of these objectives profoundly influenced the overwhelming tactical success found during OEF-A. As demonstrated by events during the war itself and by practices in conflicts since, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan most certainly played a significant role in the U.S. military’s transition to the usage of the Indirect approach and the repeated utilization of Special Operations Forces to accomplish associated strategic objectives.
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