Bridges Burned: A Global “Caliphate” in Isolation

An analysis of ISIS: A History by Fawaz A. Gerges

The rise of the Islamic State has profoundly reshaped the current paradigm of non-state based modern Islamic movements, revolutionizing implementations of Salafi-jihadist ideology, the manipulation of inter- and extra-organizational bureaucracy and the management of a diasporic network. Founded in 1999 by former Mujahideen and Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group has a resilient yet volatile legacy, dispersed in terms of both geographic location and chronological scope of ambition. Capitalizing upon the influence of sectarian militias, foreign governments and other Salafi-jihadist organizations, the Islamic State was able to both capture land and administer the likenings of an Islamic Caliphate in occupied territory. However, the inability and unwillingness of Islamic State to maintain these relationships, coupled with inconsistent and unmeasured geopolitical ambition, ultimately led to the forced dissolution of the areal holdings in Iraq in Syria. It is important to note, however, that the Islamic State has, in the past, faced similar deviations in the potency of its regional influence and met these setbacks with anticipatory evolution. Through disquieting implementation of apocalyptic vision, subversion of aligned parties and proficiency in international outreach, the former Caliphate has challenged popular perceptions of both religious and political movements, restructuring the model for successful Salafi-jihadist militancy with their scorched-earth politics. Certainly, the Islamic State of 2019 is not fading into obscurity, but rather, is slinking back into the shadows.

This versatility of mode is evident in Fawaz Gerges’ analysis of the Islamic State’s ascent in ISIS: A History. Gerges, a Professor of Middle East Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, grew up in the crosshairs of the civil war that divided Lebanon during the latter half of the 20th Century. Raised Christian Orthodox, his hometown became a target for Islamic extremists after 1975, forcing teenage Gerges and his family to seek refuge in local monasteries, escaping to Syria for a year before emigrating to the United States. Shaped by his immersion in the Lebanese conflict at an early age, Gerges went on to receive an M.Sc. at the London School of Economics and a Ph.D. from Oxford University, specializing in the affairs of the Middle East. The author of more than a dozen books ranging from the history of Saudi Arabia to foreign policy under the Obama administration, Gerges delves into a myriad of complex subjects with proficiency, earning not just accolades but also opportunities, such as the MacArthur, Fullbright and Carnegie Fellowships. Gerges’s experience in the Middle East extends far beyond his early life, having engaged in extensive field study throughout the region. ISIS: A History is only the second most recent in a sizeable collection of historic, religious and cultural synthesis, informed by nearly three decades of research and writings on Islam, social movements and the Middle East. Separating itself from military history, this analysis sets the stage for the expansion of the Islam State, providing political, religious and cultural context for the organization’s success (“About, Fawaz Gerges”).

Gerges paints the Islamic State, in all of its iterations, as a master of chaos. Empowered by the political and sectarian unrest fomented by the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, the organization (at the time, self decreed as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn and colloquially, Al-Qaeda in Iraq/AQI) was able to coerce significant ideological backing from Al-Qaeda Central (AQC) after pledging bay’ah to its leader, Osama bin Laden and managed to secure operational support in Iraq from Sunni insurgent militias with the creation of the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) in 2006. The willingness of Sunnis to engage in the compromise came primarily as a response to their marginalization under the newly elected Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. Although approximately 66% of Iraqis are Shia, the 32% minority population of Sunnis enjoyed superior political agency and authority prior to Saddam Hussein’s implementation of a more secular Ba’ath Party interpretation of Arab nationalist governance in 1979 (“CIA World Factbook: Iraq”, 2019). The ascension of the Shiite majority under Prime Minister Maliki in 2006 drove a wedge between the already fractured sectarian divide, further isolating the Sunni triangle from the remainder of Iraq. As violence along the Sunni/Shiite line flared, AQI jumped on the opportunity, taking primary control of Al Anbar, Diyala and Baghdad, with Baqubah as the capital of the newly proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). However, ISI’s territorial claims quickly dissipated as the U.S Troop Surge in 2007 facilitated the killing or capture of more than 80% of ISI leadership by 2010 (Shanker, 2010). Despite largely operating in extremis as a dispersed network of affiliates—following the death of Zarqawi in 2006—from 2007-2011, the leadership vacuum was filled by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who transformed the organization, leading to the territorial ascent of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, which controlled more than 34,000 square miles of city and countryside at its peak (“IS ‘Caliphate’ Defeated but Jihadist Group Remains a Threat”, 2019).

Gerges is sure to articulate that the resurgence of the Islamic State was by no means a direct result of the Arab Spring uprisings across North Africa and the Levant. Rather, the collapse of absolute authority in these states provided a breeding ground for a wide range of ideological movements, from secular-democratic organization to Salafi-jihadist hakimiyya in which groups most willing to engage in overwhelming and targeted violence filled the void of legitimacy. This explains the rapid growth of insurgencies such as Abu Mohammad al-Julani’s Jabhat an-Nuṣrah li-Ahli ash-Shām (al-Nusra Front) supported by ISI in Syria. Baghdadi’s 2013 declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIL)—a merger between the two—was rejected by both Julani and Ayman al-Zawahiri of AQC, highlighting the policy of bridge-burning and power consolidation central to the Islamic State’s operational dealings. This became a trademark of the organization, as it claimed absolute religious and legal authority over all Muslims and non-Muslims within the Caliphate and beyond. With the proclamation on the 29th of June, 2014 that ISIL was now to be known as the “worldwide caliphate” or “Islamic State”, so began continued territorial conquest within the failed states of Iraq and Syria and the control of thousands of square miles, millions of human beings and billions of dollars.

The ensuing movement towards this global Islamic Caliphate is inextricably tied to the development of the organization’s focus on eschatology and apocalypticism, the implementation of this vision separating the Islamic State from other Salafi-jihadist organizations. Opportunistic from its inception, the Islamic State proclaimed its desire to form a regional Sunni Islamic state, primarily drawing upon the ideology of Islamic strategists and extremist religious scholars. Works such as the Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr Naji, Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad by Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir and The Essentials of Making Ready for Jihad by Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif led to the Islamic State to the conclusion that the first priority in establishing a legitimate Caliphate was the acquisition of “Muslim lands” and the purification of Islam guided by the fiqh of the Caliphate’s supreme leader, the Caliph (Gerges, 2016, p. 34). The transition of focus from the pragmatic engagement of the “near enemy”—the Shia population of Iraq and the Assad government in Syria—to the “far enemy”—the greater “Western World”—was central to the Islamic State’s assertion of their preeminence as the global Islamic authority, motivated by unforeseen operational advances.

Not since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 had any state with such expansive control laid claim to this title, a concept that all but fell into obscurity during colonial control and the rise of nationalist governance in the Middle East after the First World War (Howard, 2017, p. 318). After military success across Iraq and the Levant, the Islamic State continued to exercise this universal religious authority in territories under its occupation while moving towards a more offensive global position, using a network of foreign fighters across Europe, Northern Africa and South-East Asia. On 29 June 2014, what was then known as ISIL, decreed itself a worldwide caliphate, stating “It is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to and support him [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi]… The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organisations, becomes null by the expansion of the caliph’s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas” (Lawrence, 2014). Harkening back to the days of the Salaf (the first three generations of Muslims, originating with the Prophet Muhammad) and looking towards final Day of Judgment (Yawm ad-Din), the Islamic State enticed young Sunni’s worldwide with the promise of an utopian Caliphate and the reclamation of stability amidst the violence and uncertainty, that many from West Africa to Southern Asia had become accustomed to in the 21st century. Effectuating its claims of global influence, the Caliphate expanded its scope of operations in 2014, enabling acts of terrorism outside of its territory that continues through 2019.

The organization attempted to provoke a response from Western nations through these acts of disquieting carnage, a strategy that was met with the desired response. Domestic outrage at the capabilities of Islamic State sleeper cells and their affiliates resulted in the alignment of a coalition to combat the Caliphate’s territorial advances and international reach. As the proto-State fractured in Syria and Iraq throughout 2015-2018, acts of terrorism abroad became more desperate, functioning as the proprietary tool for recruitment and fear mongering. The dissolution of its Syrian and Iraqi in March of 2019 and the Islamic State’s reversion to a dissipated network of operatives and offshoots have fundamentally undermined its claim to authority over a greater Islamic Caliphate. Ultimately, Gerges offers that it is this strategic shift of focus from the organization’s home in Iraq and the Levant, to the more expansive ambition of inspiring jihad globally—coupled with an inherently totalitarian structure and self-destructive manifesto—that will eventually lead to the decomposition of the Islamic State’s regional influence (Gerges, 2016, p. 271).

The Islamic State clearly breaks the mold of most Salafi-jihadist organizations, certainly in its operational success but also in its chameleon ideology and capacity to resist internal and external opposition. Few organizations that engage in systematic violence in a pseudo-state or organizational capacity have been able to do so on the scale or for the duration of the Islamic State. However, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan presents an interesting comparison in all of its iterations, amassing similar expanses of territory while resisting both foreign and domestic pressures. Despite these similarities, the Afghan Islamic fundamentalist movement diverges significantly in its objectives and methods of control. Mirroring the ascent Islamic State, the Taliban found success in a post-war power vacuum, steadily amassing support in the disarray left by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent civil conflict between regional warlords competing for control. As children of the rural refugee camps and students of Pashtun madrassas, the Taliban—led by Muhammed Omar—offered stability to provinces torn apart by years of internal violence, ruling with a strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law (Rashid, 2010, p. 85) Supported materially and ideologically by the neighboring Pakistani government, the Taliban quickly took control of large expanses of rural and urban land, capturing Kabul in 1996 and declaring all administered areas as part of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (Abbas, 2015). Aid from Pakistan during their initial acquisition of territory and subsequent transitions to guerrilla insurgency was crucial to the Taliban. Their vision—to bring about stability by way of conservative Islamic governance—did not extend beyond the borders of Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), allowing them to work somewhat symbiotically with other regional powers, from al-Qaeda Central to the Qatari government. Quite oppositely, the Islamic State’s subsequent objective of amassing absolute authority by establishing governance over their self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate led leadership to reject any meaningful long-term diplomatic our economic partnership with neighboring states or similarly motivated Islamic movements. The ability of the Taliban to engage in partnerships and alliance significantly contributed to its ability to fluctuate rapidly between retreat to Pashtun territory and resurgence in South Eastern provinces, making political compromises not bound by ideological separations. This flexible and enduring model, founded in Quranic exegesis and Islamic jurisprudence draws a stark contrast to the Islamic State’s rigid ideology informed by a limited number of Salafi-jihadist interpretations of military policy and Sunni supremacy. The inelasticity of the Islamic State’s affiliations indicates that its future organizational effectiveness may be limited to power vacuums outside of its original territory, while the willingness of the Taliban to mold to its surroundings signifies its potential to outlast external opposition in the long run.

When the book was published in 2016, Gerges predicted that it would be these factors—those that led to the initial ascension of the Islamic State—that would eventually precipitate its downfall. The frustration felt by many Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis at the hands of the U.S. military, the Ba’ath Party and later Shi’ite governance gave the Islamic State the opportunity to capitalize upon this resentment, creating a movement that promised to right the perceived wrongs of these previous power structures. Gerges argues that the “Caliphate’s utopia” continually promised by Islamic State had failed to materialize in 2016 for the millions living under its rule and that internal revolutionary movements would soon gain steam, as the bread and butter provisions of war-footing governance began to wear out. Furthermore, a lack of adequate planning for bureaucracy and the maintenance of the bellicose state would soon lead to infighting while under siege by the international coalition (Gerges, 2016, p. 283). Ultimately, it was this combination of military superiority and resolve by the coalition, including SDF, U.S, and Iraqi forces, that led to the rapid dissolution of the pseudo-state. However, Gerges fully acknowledges that the defeat of a physically bound Caliphate does by no means indicate the end of the Islamic State’s extremist Salafi-jihadist ideology as a influence in the region, nor does it completely hamper its ability to operate internationally, through formally and loosely associated jihadist organizations (Gerges, 2016, p. 291). To fully remove the threat of the Islamic State and the myriad of other similar organizations waiting to take its place, Gerges argues that a coalition of local actors from the Maghreb to South Asia must come together to shift the paradigm of governance. To combat the nihilistic and oppressive ideology, the region at-large needs to work towards a public apparatus that is supported by civil law and citizen engagement, allowing discourse while straying away from a fusion of Islam and governance. Acknowledging the difficulty in extrapolating the two from one another, Gerges reminds us that this process will undoubtedly take time and that wounds will not heal quickly (Gerges, 2016, p. 292-3). However, with the Islamic State on the decline, Gerges paints a future with the possibility for progress, so long as the region searches genuinely to create an honest and unbiased understanding of the underlying causes of this civilizational backslide.

Gerges is descriptive, relying heavily on statistical evidence and potent anecdotes, presenting a history that strays from erroneous judgment yet makes clear the social and political ramifications of the surging Islamic State. His conclusion regarding the dangers of sectarian violence and theologically shrouded totalitarianism are accurate, though his trajectory largely ignores the niche details of military affairs that played a significant role in the Caliphates ability to amass such an enclave. Specifically, the steadfast allegiance of young supporters, many of which were volunteer foreign fighters from North Africa, Western Europe and the remainder of the Middle East, provided the state with an ideologically resilient, 30,000 man bulwark against the Iraqi and Syrian government forces during its acquisitional campaigns (Sarhan, 2015). Gerges’ focus remains on the larger context of the Islamic State’s success, however, and at this distance, the tactical proficiency of the group’s individual combatants becomes rather inconsequential. What is more important is the thinking that fuels it, indicating that the Islamic State will not fade into oblivion after its losses in the Levant. Over 60 jihadist groups in more than 30 countries have sworn bay’ah to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his organization, operating insurgencies and terror cells across the globe (“Islamic State (IS)”, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium). While impotent as a military threat in the lands of its former Caliphate, the danger of the “ISIS ideology” has far from dissipated. Gerges’ analysis predicts this reality in a cogent manner, linearly weaving the context of the organization’s growth, the effectiveness of enigmatic leadership and its methods of operational success, providing a consumable and authoritative warning to the reader concerning the allure of Islamic State’s eschatarian vision. In the same vein, Gerges also lays out a path forward, offering steps to remedy the simple attraction of Salafi-jihadism. ISIS: A History functions as more than just an account or an analysis. It is a powerful narrative that presents both success and failure, ultimately aimed to guide future response to the reactionary and corrosive foundations of the Islamic State.

Citations

Abbas, H. (2015). The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier. Yale University Press.

Gerges, F. A. (2014, July 12). About. Retrieved from https://fgerges.net/about/

Gerges, F. A. (2016). ISIS: A History. Princeton University Press.

Howard, D. A. (2017). A History of the Ottoman Empire. Cambridge University Press.

Lawrence, J. (2014, July 02). Could an ISIS Caliphate Ever Govern the Muslim World? Retrieved from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-02/could-an-isis-caliphate-ever-govern-the-muslim-world/5559806

Middle East News. (2010, June 04). US says 80% of al-Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Removed. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/10243585

Middle East News. (2019, March 23). IS ‘caliphate’ Defeated but Jihadist Group Remains a Threat. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595

Rashid, A. (2010). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press.

Shanker, T. (2010, June 05). Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Neutralized, U.S. Says. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/world/middleeast/05military.html

Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. (n.d.). Islamic State (IS) / Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham (ISIS) / Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS or ISIL, IS). Retrieved from https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-iraq-and-ash-sham-isis-islamic-state-islamic-state-iraq-isis-or-isil

The World Factbook: Iraq. (2018, February 01). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html