Tensions in the Kerch Strait—the channel separating contested Crimean from the Russian mainland—boiled over in the early morning of November 25 in a show of force by Russian naval forces. While attempting to transit between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, three Ukranian vessels took fire from and were subsequently detained by the Russian military. In total, 24 Ukrainian sailors were detained, three being hospitalized due to injuries sustained during the brief engagement. This flare-up comes after months of escalation in the region, provoked by a sharp increase in Russian seizure of transiting vessels. Such inspections mark a significant departure from previously established norms of travel in the Kerch Strait, a territorial water jointly controlled by both Russian and Ukrainian authorities since 2003 (Kramer). This incident is the most recent in a series of litmus tests aimed at demonstrating Russia control in the region, forcing the United States and its NATO allies to take a stance on the controversial territorial advancement. Certainly, there are innumerable ways for scholars of international relations to interpret the events of the past month, each method with its own accuracies and shortcomings in predicting motivation and response. However, the lense of Liberalism in international relations theory provides the most convenient method of justifying the convergence of opposing interest in Crimea while simultaneously emphasizing certain realities of the hegemonic world order. 

Existing on the fringes of the modern European political collective, Ukraine is neither a member of NATO nor the European Union, leaving its borders vulnerable to Moscow’s expansionist agenda. The work of Liberal theorist Michael Doyle outlines the conceptual motivations of this territorial grab, presenting the Machiavellian notion of “Liberal Imperialism” (Doyle, 1154). The theory assumes the pursuit of regional influence, spurred by the agendas of represented peoples within a competitive and economically liberal country. Aware of this pressing reality, Ukraine has recently pursued relations with Western powers, engaging in a series of reform measures and initiating the development of an association agreement with the EU in 2013 (RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service). Yet all progress came to a halt in November of that year when the pro-Russian President, Viktor Yanukovych, refused to sign the agreement and instead pivoted towards relations with the Eurasian Economic Union. The populist Euromaidan movement responded to this initiative, sparking the Ukrainian Revolution which ousted Yanukovych in 2014, replacing him with current President, Petro Poroshenko (Kramer). Since transitioning to a new government, Ukraine has rapidly reconciled its course by applying to be a component of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area major and pursuing non-NATO ally status with the United States (Associated Press). These trends indicate Ukraine’s understanding of benefits provided through organized economic, political and security alliances with European neighbors and the U.S.

Such thought reinforces the theories of Liberal international relations theorists, prioritizing the role of collective organizations. Enlightenment thinkers Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith constructed a theoretical framework for the evolution of Liberalism, relying on the assumption that uncertainty fosters mistrust and that general collaboration towards common ends dissuades such mistrust. Liberal theorists would argue that the current tension in the Kerch Strait is simply a development of the mistrust inherent within anarchic systems when lacking mechanisms for cooperation. Both Ukraine and Russia function relatively autonomously, with significant agency concerning internal and foreign affairs. This poses a problem for Ukraine as it faces repeated territorial violations to the East while lacking an apparatus ensuring collective security. 

So far, NATO members in Eastern Europe have enjoyed significant fortification of their Eastern Borders as a result of treaty provisions, while Ukraine has dealt with Russian advancement in the Kerch Strait unassisted—save for Donald Trump’s symbolic refusal to meet with Vladimir Putin at the recent G20 summit in Argentina (Kramer). From a Liberal perspective, this inaction can be attributed to certainty in the collective security of NATO, a desire to maintain the status quo and the unpredictability that would be assumed by any direct involvement in Ukraine. This could be followed by the assertion that a preemptive association with the European community through NATO or the EU would have prevented Russia from exploiting Ukraine’s vulnerabilities in Crimea and Donbass. In this sense, Liberalism seems to accurately address the reasons Russia’s clear and deliberate breach of established treaty law was allowed to occur in the first place and the resulting complacency of the international community. 

Yet the solution to the tension in Crimea is neither black nor white. Many international relations theorists agree that within the anarchic world—layered with varying levels of authority—exists a centrum of power: the hegemon. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. has functioned as the main proprietor of international influence throughout the world, disproportionately responsible for general legitimacy of many post-War IGOs and global multilateral treaties. In this role, the U.S. faces three principal challenges in responding to the incident in the Kerch Strait: the labor of consensus building, the potential for overreach and the risk of under commitment. In constructing a collaborative front to Russian conduct in Ukraine, the U.S. is forced to sacrifice efficiency of reaction in order to preserve the commonality of interest among its allies in NATO and the EU. Without a unilaterally palatable plan of action, the hegemon risks ceding authority crafted within such IGOs by overreaching the collective mandate. Similarly critical is maintaining an appropriate level of anticipated action, as the U.S. must not draw a red line in relation to a subjective element of potential Russian activity. Doing so would create a scenario in which the hegemonic power is forced to either build consensus of forceful response within known systems or walk back the promises of engagement—both undesirable. In balancing these three primary concerns, the U.S. has opted to embrace current military and economic passivity of its NATO and EU allies and refrain from direct involvement in the matter, in order to maintain the status quo of the security collective. 

Consequently, Ukraine finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Inaction within IGOs has led Ukraine to resort to desperate measures, calling upon the international community as a whole to “retaliate against Russia by closing the Bosporus in Turkey to Russian military traffic”, lacking a dependable apparatus by which achieve certain territorial security (Kramer). The dilemma in Crimea animates the predictions of Liberalism, demonstrating the anticipated breakdown of interstate security in the absence of an international collective to act as a consolidator of interest. It further highlights the concerns faced by the U.S. at the helm of this world order, with the neoliberal hegemonic stability theory justifying the refusal of unilateral preemptive confrontation to Russian belligerence. Ukraine’s current condition provides a stern warning to states hesitant in aligning with a collective, demonstrating the resulting vulnerabilities inherent in opting out of participation in the modern political collective.

Citations:

Associated Press. “Ukraine Pushes Ahead with Plans to Secure NATO Membership.” AP News, Associated Press, 20 Sept. 2018, http://www.apnews.com/dff40992fcc446f6808d02d03b35e4bc.

Doyle, Michael W. “Liberalism and World Politics.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4, 1986, pp. 1151–1169. JSTOR, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960861.

Kramer, Andrew E. “EU suspends trade deal talks with Ukraine”. The Boston Globe. 15 Dec. 2013, https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/12/15/suspends-trade-deal-talks-with -ukraine/gzOIK9J1kFp2wMKw0IblVI/story.html

Kramer, Andrew E. “Ukraine’s President Appeals for NATO Support After Russia Standoff.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 Nov. 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/ukraine-russia-nato.html.

RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service. “Ukraine’s Cabinet Backs EU Association Agreement.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, RFE/RL, 18 Sept. 2013, http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-eu-membership-association-agreement-government-approve/25109791.html.