Is Populism Really So Bad for Democracy?

Populism, as a political mechanism, necessitates and derives power from the structures of democracy. Conversely, the longevity and effectiveness of democratic structure can be improved by the existence of populist movements, even if their ideology is anti-democratic in nature. Essentially, populism functions as an outlet for those that claim disenfranchisement or underrepresentation in government, providing a structure through which they can express their discontent. Populist movements function as rejections of the status quo and condemnations of the elite, attempting to rearrange the order of the government’s priorities and, in doing so, often exist on the fringe of a county’s mainstream political arena. Touting esoteric yet engaging messages, populist movements frequently garner large bases of support, composed of lower-middle and working class constituents, while simultaneously bringing typical non-voters into the fold. The power to inspire political action and to expand voter agency, as a reaction to unsatisfactory policies of the current government, functions as a powerful prod forcing leadership to engage in reform. Though not always palatable to the opposition or those in power, populist movements regularly galvanize under-participating groups, inspire political discussion and bring about the creation of more moderate forces, ultimately contributing to the net function of democratic society. A non-homogenous phenomena, populism is not inherently good or bad for democracy. Rather, it is a swing of the pendulum, an essential motion in the constant fluctuation of cultural, political and philosophical sentiments.

As a pattern forming activity, an individual’s voting record is the best indication of the likelihood that they exercise the right to cast a ballot on a given occasion. According to research by Alexander Coppock and Donald P. Green, the voting frequency of a constituent is substantially linked to their propensity to vote in the present election and that individual campaigns or movements can initiate trends towards long-term ballot engagement (Coppock and Green, 2015). By and large, populist movements tend to attract a younger, less complacent audience that has an appetite for engagement but lacks a reference for their activity, a trend highlighted by Bernie Sander’s 2016 Presidential campaign that polled extraordinary high with youth voters in the Democratic primaries (Kawashima, Kei, et al., 2016). Similarly, portions of the population that view the establishment warily and generally abstain from voting are brought to response by the populist rejection of the current power structure, with research findings concluding that populist movements “reduce education-based gaps and even reverse income-based inequalities in political participation” (Anduiza, Eva, et al., 2019). The reversal of socioeconomic trends in political participation is a strength of populism, which by colloquial definition, operates in ideological defence of the perceived “common man”. In both cases of involvement, frustration and dissatisfaction inspire engagement, involving previously inactive constituencies in civil participation (Cheeseman, Nic, et al., 2019). In this sense, populist movements function as incubators for political participation, a self-perpetuating trend. In countries that lack compulsory voting laws or robust civil societies, an abundance of populist sentiment can grow a new population of politically engaged constituents.

However, the development of such populist factions often necessitates staunch opposition. Holding the same contrarian positions, both right wing and left wing populist movements inspire reaction from moderate entities that either hold power or view the “egalitarian” call for massive readjustment as drastic. According to research by political scientists at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, an influx of populist voters tends to precipitate a concurrent increase in non-institutionalized forms of civic participation, ranging from public demonstration to petition signing (Anduiza, Eva, et al., 2019). Though the findings conclude that populist movements do not necessarily contribute to higher turnouts of voters from oppositional parties, the engagement that is fostered in the public sphere contributes to increased awareness of issues raised by those populist group (Rooduijn, 2017). Noting a correlation between online political activities and these material civic manifestations of populist opponents, the age of social media and the internet has profoundly transformed the way in which the voting population reckons with these types of movements. However, the benefit of political participation is a double edged sword in its relationship with populism, specifically in manifestations on social media platforms. In 2014, European right-wing populist groups, such as France’s former National Front and the UK’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), utilised the infrastructure of sites such as Facebook and Twitter to disseminate their far-right messaging during the European Parliamentary elections. Growing exponentially from relative obscurity, the success of these parties can be in part attributed to the rapid circulation of populist sentiments spread between two social media platforms. Reaching across generational cleavages and educational divides, populists went on to win the largest share of EU parliamentary seats, both in France and the UK (Ernst, Nicole, et al., 2016). The social media savviness of the National Front and UKIP extended their populist ideology in a more direct manner to “the people”, the target audience of these movements, founded on the reactionary call for societal and economic reforms. Leveraging the tools of the 21st century, populist movements both further their own agendas and foment broadened civil discourse.

By the abetment of disenfranchised populaces and the instigation of online and real-world political discourse, populist movements tend to strengthen the resolve of coalition governments or moderate parties in the years following success. Populist movements across the political spectrum challenge the legitimacy of state institutions, targeting these as roadblocks in the attempt to dissolve elitist power structures. The bounceback from widespread populist sentiment to moderate tendencies is well documented, most recently occurring across Europe and North America from 2018 to 2019. In the United States—after the steady rise of the Tea Party faction in the Republican Party and the election of right wing populist, Donald Trump—moderate and liberal Democrats received affirmative support to their rejection of these movements in the 2018 off-year, special and midterm elections, gaining the majority in the House of Representatives and securing the Office of Governor in seven states (U.S. Census Bureau). Similarly, in the Eastern European nation of Poland, a coalition of opposition parties succeeded in ousting the anti-immigrant, populist ruling party in a number of 2018 mayoral elections, countering the government’s tightly-held electoral achievements in reaction to EU immigration policies. Though the Law and Justice party—led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski—still maintains both parliament and the presidency, it faces an unsure future as a wash of moderate readjustment retakes governments in the face of right-wing European populism (Sierakowski, 2018). These individual instances are emblematic of a historical trend found when populist movements develop to the point of authority in democratic systems. Furthermore, as the majority of these parties develop spontaneously in reaction to constantly evolving economic or societal crisis, the longevity and effectiveness of their governance is often minimal. The reaction to populism that adversarially confronts the institutions of liberal democracy is often swift and overpowering, allowing entities pandering to the fringes to participate, while in turn offering a counterbalance to authoritarian tendencies.

However, the dangers of populism manifest in the implementers’ ability to exploit power vacuums in times of crisis. By definition, the ideology must operate within liberal democracies, which are typically supported by nationals invested in the rule of law established by representational suffrage. In some cases, populist movements present challenges to the very systems of consent that allowed them to take power in the first place. Often, it is personalist movements—as opposed to those of social ideology or party identity—that attempt to erode these norms of democracy in the national emergencies from which they so frequently rise (Mudde and Rovira, 42). The Fifth Republic Movement—led by former Venzuelian President Hugo Chavez—functions as a prime example of the corruption of the institution that capable populists engage in. Running on an anti-poverty and anti-corruption platform, Chavez took office in the 1998 Presidential election while condemning the two major Venezuelan parties. In subsequent decades, Chavez engaged in a massive consolidation of power in which he collapsed the judiciary, nationalized export industries and illegitamized elections, contrasting his initial calls for Venezuela to “democratize” (Ellner, 2002). The recent collapse of authority in the South American nation points to the dangers of tolerating anti-democratic populist movements, providing a warning to those that wish to remain politically neutral in civic engagement.

This above anything else is the central factor in determining the outcome of a populist movement on democracy. It is not the content of the movement itself—whether it is anti-immigrant or anti-bank, to the left or to the right—rather the agency and willingness of opposing ideologies to provide a substantive rebuke to authoritarian or exclusionary tendencies. Regardless of contextual goals, populist movements play a critical role in modern liberal democracy, ensuring that the disenfranchised enjoy political participation while simultaneously advancing the debate of pertinent topics across the voting population, bolstering the establishment of democratic norms though the mean reaction to populist intentions. However, these positive ramifications are only made possible through diligent civil awareness and participation, required to maintain populism as an occasional swing of the democratic pendulum.

Citations:

Anduiza, Eva, et al. “Populism, Participation, and Political Equality.” Cambridge Core, Cambridge University Press, 11 Feb. 2019, 

Cheeseman, Nic, et al. “How Populism Can Be Turned into an Opportunity, Not a Threat.” The Conversation, The Conversation US, 12 Apr. 2019, 

Coppock, Alexander, and Donald P. Green. “Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from Experiments and Regression Discontinuities.” American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd (10.1111), 8 Sept. 2015, 

Ellner, Steve, S. “The ‘Radical’ Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez”. Latin American Perspectives, 2002, 29 (6): 88–93

Ernst, Nicole, et al. “Populism and Social Media: How Politicians Spread a Fragmented Ideology.” Taylor & Francis Online, 2016, 

Kawashima, Kei, et al. “2016 Election: Donald Trump and Young Voters.” The Center For Information & Research On Civic Learning & Engagement, Tufts University, June 2016, 

Mudde, Cas, and Kaltwasser Cristóbal Rovira. Populism: a Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017.

Rooduijn, Matthijs. “What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist Parties | European Political Science Review.” Cambridge Core, Cambridge University Press, 20 June 2017, 

Sierakowski, Slawomir. “The Beginning of the End for Poland’s Populists?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 6 Nov. 2018, 

“U.S. Census Bureau, The 2018 Statistical Abstract, The National Data Book, Elections: Gubernatorial and State Legislatures”. http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/