This week, France mourns its deadliest military failure since the 1983 Beirut Barrack Bombings, losing 13 military personnel in a tragic helicopter mishap on the evening of November 25th. Flying at a low altitude in pursuit of an insurgent caravan, two French helicopters collided in Southern Mali, near the border of Burkina Faso and Niger, killing all those aboard the two aircraft. Events like this inspire reflection, calling into question the purpose and efficacy of the nation’s involvement in the region. After six years of intervention, the continuation of Operation Barkhane stands on shaky ground domestically, with many prominent political commentators labeling the situation as a quagmire. However, if history tells us anything, it is clear that the abandonment of France’s G5 Sahel partners will only lead to further instability. It is imperative that France and the G5 remove Operation Barkhane from the back burner and take bold steps to enable eventual peace in the Western Sahel. Only through a counterintuitive process of deliberate diplomatic engagement with insurgencies, followed by significant investments in local economies, will the region find an acceptable conclusion.

Instability grew in the region following the Arab Spring, as arms from the 2011 Libyan Civil War spilled South across the Sahara into Northern Mali, enabling the Tuareg rebellion of 2012. After the Malian plea for French military aid, a European alliance led Operation Serval which cleared Northern Mali of the regional insurgency by 2014, at which point the mission transformed into Operation Barkhane. By engaging the collective of G5 Sahel partners—comprised of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Mauritania—the operation aimed to prevent the growing influence of jihadist terrorism in Southern Mali. While originally faced with a multidimensional threat from disparate network of small terror groups, the situation intensified in 2017 when Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb coalesced to form the merger organization, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’, colloquially known as Nusrat al-Islam (Newlee, 2019). In 2019, Nusrat al-Islam and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), defying conventional hostilities between al-Qaeda and Islamic State williyahs, working in tandem to combat the stabilizing efforts of the G5 Sahel and French militaries.

Seemingly ignorant of this shift, the anti-terrorism coalition is still doing what it set out to do: maintain control government territory and prevent the ability of regional jihadist groups to carry out acts of terror. However, there is little government-controlled territory is left to maintain and Nusrat al-Islam and ISGS are no longer the underequipped terror cells they once were; rather, they exist as full-blown insurgencies, combining assets which allow them to rapidly expand their influence in the region and acting with violent authority. Yet, these developments that have unsettled France and its Sahel coalition could in fact present an opportunity in disguise. 

Though somewhat counterintuitive, the increased capacity for effective insurgency that comes with a larger foundation necessitates a decrease in organizational maneuverability. With vast swaths of territory and militants under the control of both organizations following their resurgence, present inter and intra-group cohesion of both Nusrat al-Islam and ISGS can be exploited to sow the seeds of conflict between the two organizations. In the case of Mali, the answer lies in carefully orchestrated negotiation. It is not without irony that the type of diplomacy needed is far from the “French System”; no ambassador within the walls embassy or consulate on either side will manifest or achieve the desired effect. Rather, the effectiveness of “the embassy” will be its versatility and adaptability as described by G. R. Berridge in Diplomacy: Theory and Action, founded its ability to engage in the unsavory allocation of foreign aid to an adversary, in a clandestine manner (130-132). By bringing Nusrat al-Islam to the table with incentive, France and its partners would initiate a process of concealed alienation, in which the jihadist leadership struggles to reach consensus and distrust between the insurgencies is fostered. An infusion of material and financial wealth into Nusrat al-Islam—on the condition that there is cessation of terroristic violence and expansionist pursuit—will serve to inject imbalance into the current situation. With discrepancies in expenditure and insurgecy capability, the organizations will find themselves at odds with one another, derailing their ability to continue successful campaigns against the government, forcing ISGS to challenge Nusrat al-Islam’s newfound legitimacy. As negotiations continue, differing priorities will manifest across the former factions within the organization itself, leading to internal strife while facing a two-front engagement with both ISGS and French coalition forces. Political scientist C. A. J. Coady argues that “we can admit the grain of truth in the cynical slogan, ‘If you want peace, prepare for war,’ but the surer path to a more tranquil world is to prepare for peace directly” (36). In the same vein, I argue that if you want successful war, you must first prepare peace. While temporarily destabilizing, this ploy of legitimacy would function as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, bringing both jihadist networks to relative dissolution in contrast their current authority.

While it is true that such a move would fail to win the current French administration any elections, it would start a legitimate advance towards success in the Sahel. Negotiations begets legitimacy and shifts in legitimacy beget insecurities. Complementing these initiatives with meaningful investments in local communities throughout Southern Mali would further incentivize local insurgents to re-engage in society, whittling down the effective exploitation of resource scarcity by both Nusrat al-Islam and ISGS. To address the problem head-on and to avoiding prolonged growth of militancy or the abandonment of the Sahel partners, it is imperative that France take these unpopular yet meaningful steps towards progress in the region.

Works Cited

“Bilateral Diplomacy: Conventional.” Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, by G. R. Berridge, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 130–132.

Coady, C. A. J. The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. United States Institute of Peace, 2002.

Newlee, Danika. “Jama’at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) – TNT Terrorism Backgrounder.” Jama’at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) | Center for Strategic and International Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019, http://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin.