To understand the outcome of any game, one must understand its rules. The same must be said of politics and governance. In both, the full picture is often found in a recognition of the ways in which these same rules are created, modified and applied. Anyone who watches baseball expects the batter to run the bases counterclockwise, however, those not acquainted with the nuances of the sport would watch in confusion if an infielder were to intentionally drop an easy catch, following the little known “infield fly” rule. Being well versed in the detailed minutiae of the rule book can make or break games, providing evident advantage to competent players. Similarly, those in government with the ability to traverse and mold their own operating framework—their institutions—gain an upper hand in the effectuation of pertinent interest. However, just as these entities strive to forge their own paths, the routes that are pursued in-between, around and through established institutions fundamentally shape the end result and consequently, the nature of politics. The interaction between interest in jurisdiction, agenda power and veto power, decisiveness, and delegation has the potential to profoundly direct the manner in which government functions, these principles manifesting primarily in the American Presidency, and the Executive and Legislative branches (LGSA, p. 12) 

Institutions, necessarily so, are composed of varied and interacting mechanisms to ensure an output predetermined by the body’s raison-d’etre. At its core, an institution is dependent upon standardization and structure, factors that increase in complexity and linkage as the entity seeks to meet further demands. Institutions are meant to solve problems that arise, arrive at solutions and present or act upon potential courses of action to address each matter in question. It is best to think of these groups as sorting machines—methodically identifying and processing—each coded and constantly adjusted to meet desired objectives. It is through this undulating crowd of competition, breeding hierarchies and standard operating procedures, that a pattern in politics becomes clear. The interaction between interest in efficiency, operational domain, stratified structures and agenda setting has the potential to profoundly direct the manner in which government functions.

Developing awareness of the monumental apparatus that is the United States federal government demands a clear conception of the American presidency—its norms and its procedures. The office of President must be understood to be the tip of an iceberg, representing only a small fraction of total components and processes necessary to generate the position’s current power. Today, as the president is vested with additional powers by each political actor and regulatory agency that attempts to further their respective interests, the head of the executive is able to progressively expand authorities that match their own exclusive goals (LGSA, p. 270). It is evident here that the ability to adjust jurisdiction is integral to the evolution and effectuation of the president’s objectives. 

Preconceived jurisdiction and following modifications to structure enacted to expand delegation have created the Presidency that we know today. Originally conceived with five preeminent and general responsibilities—delineated as military, judicial, diplomatic, executive and legislative authority—the institution itself has demanded the blurring and development of each. This transformation is primarily evident in two recent developments: the broadening of inherent powers and the bolstering of the institutional presidency. Contemporaneous in growth, the constant redefinition of these elements of the executive office have dictated outcomes since the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (LGSA, p. 264). The President’s role as Commander in Chief has evolved dramatically in administrations following the second World War, the institutional rules shifting to allow the president greater autonomy in executing the implied power of “self-protection”—i.e. pursuing the interests pertinent to national security (LGSA, p. 264). Following oversight measures have motivated the Commander in Chief to pursue engagements that rely heavily on both intelligence activities and international partnerships as opposed to conventional military operations. The former manifests clearly during the Global War on Terror across three administrations, in which all presidents opted to pursue paramilitary intelligence options when engaging with non-combatant countries, in order to avoid the mandatory Congressional notification and 60-day prohibition on troop commitment (LGSA, p. 265). Regarding reliance on external partnerships, the Clinton administration’s 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo was hastily transferred to NATO jurisdiction in order to prevent similar friction. Regardless of trepidation and maneuvering by various administrations, legal questions have rarely been raised in Congress regarding the potential violations of the War Powers Act of 1973, allowing Presidents to shape internal institutional norms to benefit their exclusive interest. 

In relation to the institutional presidency, the addition of supplemental elements to the Executive Office of the President (EOP) has transformed the process and outcomes of decision making. Different methods of institutional organization yield different results, some enforcing hierarchical structures while others encourage varied discourse among parties. Most notable in its uniqueness is the EOP under Richard Nixon, an apparatus that focused solely on the funneling of information to the National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. By constructing an institution in which intergroup competition was low and recommendations were filtered through a single lens—with little exception—Nixon set himself up to battle against Kissinger’s personality as opposed to the issues at hand. This self-selected condition led to a prolonged series of miscalculated and highly personal decisions, including the heavy bombing of both Cambodia and North Vietnam. Though functioning disfavorably within the Nixon White House, intentioned modifications to the institutional presidency have outcomes that can go both ways, steering the course of a President’s term in office.

Though the Executive Branch extends from and is ultimately subordinate to the Office of the President, it should be understood as a discrete entity, primarily for its vast responsibility and agency in carrying out the resolutions of elected officials. Within the executive, a combination of cabinet departments, independent agencies, government corporations, and independent regulatory commissions attempt to execute and enforce the often-vague measures. These bureaucracies are unique in their ability to address the nuances that arise within their purview, cultivating agents that are able to consistently meet institutional demands through specialization and structure. However, these highly niche formations within executive agencies can also limit holistic response, often inhibiting the ability of the government to address ongoing developments. This constant struggle between jurisdiction and decisiveness is evident in agency response to both legislation and internal directives.

As the Office of President has increased in policy related autonomy, the authorities and capabilities of executive entities have grown to encompass a variety of compartmentalized responsibilities. The Environmental Protection Agency provides a potent demonstration of this evolution, created as an independent executive agency to address environmental health as pertains to domestic policy. However, as a result of increased polarization and subsequent stalling of legislative direction, the EPA has begun to respond to national concerns via executive action, as opposed to Congressional input. This has led to recent administrations using the efficient pipeline of the EPA bureaucracy to modify environmental policy in a direct manner. Both the Obama and Trump administration have used this institutional backdoor to implement politically favorable policies, thanks to the aforementioned modifications in structure jurisdiction. Actions in 2013 underscore this flexibility, when the Obama White House directed a tiered reduction in CO2 emissions, bypassing Congress in the process (LGSA, p. 319). However, the structure of agencies can have the opposite effect on outcomes, some designed to protect sub-units from top down interference. Consider the Central Intelligence Agency, which was able to conceal enhanced interrogation from Congressional oversight for ten years, thanks to highly institutionalized policies of plausible deniability and delegated authority. Such structures allowed little authority to both the President and Congress—instead relying on key intermediaries for authorization—resulting in evident changes in policy outcomes.

The legislative branch is an institution filled with a complex web of procedure and hierarchies. Unquestionably, its current role is vastly transformed from its place in the government of the nation’s founders, having experienced uncountable modifications to procedure based on evolving governing norms. Following strict bylaws that govern the legislative process, parties represented in Congress attempt to bend and modify conditions to benefit their interests, often causing permanent alterations to the institution in the process. Increased polarization of representatives and senators has only contributed to these developments, going beyond individual contention to intentionally divide political blocs through established procedure. An increase in centralized determination by political parties has been paramount in these shifts, illustrating the role of agenda power and delegation within the legislative body.

No Congressional leader has received more press for implemented modifications than, Republican House Speaker Dennis Hastert, who fundamentally redefined the manner in which members of parties fight for favor within the institution. Central to the adjustments is the Committee system—groups historically ordered by seniority—which ultimately dictates the survival or death of legislation. In attempts to consolidate power within the upper echelons of the party, Hastert delegated authority to the party’s respective leadership to select and adjust committee assignments. As bills proceed from introduction to the floor of each house, they must first pass through committees which may enact gatekeeping authority or proposal powers on legislation that is presented (LGSA, p. 215). As the membership of committees is integral in producing optimal conditions for passage or rejection, the ability of party leadership to use the delegated authority assignments as a bargaining chip is critical to legislative outcomes—a factor that has undoubtedly compounded the widening gap between Republicans and Democrats (LGSA, p. 226). The informal but lasting “majority of the majority” rule of the late 1990s functions in a similar manner, preventing a floor vote from occurring without the support of the majority of the majority party with the body. This has allowed majority party leadership to dictate the agenda of the entirety of the legislative branch, a main factor in the failure of many recent DACA propositions, as they failed to develop the support of the majority of the Republican Party. In sum, the opportunity for modification of institutional procedure—paired with that which has already been established—has great impact on legislation that the congress is able to consider and pass.

Ultimately, the institution is the means by which an end is achieved. As such, the structure and process therein are integral to the understanding of any resulting decision or action by the government. In the United States, countless corrections to these entities have changed the paradigm of politics in a permanent manner. Just like baseball, the rules of the game determine the action, and any inspection of the condition of the U.S. government must be paired with clear and deliberate analysis of the institutions of which it is formed.