This has persisted since January of 2012, when an insurgency—led by Tuareg militants—developed in the north of the country. These insurgents formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), demanding the government of Mali to recognize Tuareg majority areas in the northern half of the country as independent and autonomous. In short, the NMLA cause has always been one of secession, attempting to remove the authority of the centralized Malian government. The situation complicated in the spring of 2012, when successful NMLA militants declared a free state of Azawad and began to deal with the political and strategic ramifications of their self-propagated instability. Just as was the case with Iraq and Syria, extremist religious elements took advantage of the power vacuum left in the wake of civil conflict, exploiting a security crisis for the sake of their own expansion. This pattern of growth has been observed frequently in the past decade, in which Salafi-jihadist movements strategically use their own forces to drive wedges into civil divides. This technique has been highly effective for agitators in the case of the Sahel region, even leading to coalition activity between al-Qaeda and Islamic State groups, a phenomenon that has not been recorded prior to Mali.
The complexity of this evolution makes the Maclean article invaluable in dissecting the status of war in the Sahel region. It is a potent commentary on the toll of asymmetrical warfare on the economic and political capabilities of foreign actors, using the turn of phrase commonly applied to the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan to describe the French military’s relationship with the Sahel. Maclean describes the somewhat naive expectations of French leadership in their initial prospects for participation in counterterrorism and stability operations, indicating that the office of the French Foreign Minister planned for a campaign lasting only a “matter of weeks”2. This calculation fell short by nearly 7 years as French forces have continued to commit resources, responding to the networks of radical militants in the remote border regions between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Operation Barkhane has escalated of late, with French President Emmanuel Macron committing 600 additional soldiers to the effort, conditional upon greater burden sharing between G5 Sahel partner countries. Maclean portrays French strategy in the region as a $1 billion per year game of whack-a-mole, taking place across more than one-million square miles3. Without previously established connections to communities and little to no territory, extremist groups are forced to exist within the confines of remote, arid desert or densely packed urban environments. This makes targeting of adversaries a difficult endeavor, leading to a reliance on more expensive surveillance technologies, evident in the construction of a $110 million U.S. drone base in Niger4. This reality means that borders become more of a political notion than consequential entities, requiring a coordinated, joint response from all countries affected. While this has played out well due to the commitment of troops from the African Union, the formation of the G5 partnership, and support from Western nations, little progress has been made in regard to stability on the ground. Maclean’s account paints this loosely aligned coalition to be reaching in the dark, their uncertainty as immediate as the uncertainty of the people who call the Sahel their home.
As expected, Maclean does not explicitly discuss international relations theory in her article—few journalists do. However, the underpinnings appear quite plainly with further investigation. The civil war in Mali and insurgency across the rest of the Sahel presents a clear example of the validity of Collier’s “greed motive” analysis of civil war. As Collier says—to paraphrase—civil wars and any effort to limit them, are necessarily concerned with viability as opposed to rationale5. While fair arguments could be made for the validity of the Tuareg rebel’s desire for self-determination, their role in the developments across Mali acts as more of an instigator of civil conflict than one involved in prolonging it. It certainly appears to be difficult, in this day and age, to find civil conflict that manifests solely as a result of ideological conviction or political frustration, absent of compounding factors. According to Collier, there are a wide variety of elements that contribute to any group’s perception of opportunity for insurrection, this potentiality itself—uncertainty of governance—being the most consequential constituent of motivations for civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler acknowledge in “Greed and grievance in civil war” that grievance can exist concurrently with motivations of perceived opportunity, yet there is typically an auxiliary motivation6. This basic identification of opportunity is made up of a number of factors, while being heavily dependent upon the identity of those that are influenced. Conditions such as population dispersion, availability of financing and national GDP per capita are all useful statistics for understanding and predicting the likelihood of civil war. In addition, lower levels of employment, income and secondary education for young men appear to have a significant relationship with civil uprisings in countries where aforementioned factors are present. In his solo work “The market for civil war,” Collier explores another complicating component of localized conflicts—the presence of foreign involvement. This kind of intervention has become far more prevalent in the last three decades. Collier asserts that the majority of measures taken by international actors to limit the duration of foreign civil wars are not able to have the intended effect7. Conventional participation to support the initiatives of the warring countries’ governments are largely ineffective if it prioritizes direct engagement with the adversary. Collier argues that less physically overt measures should be pursued, including SALW limitations, intervention in illicit financial support and bolstering of partner nation economies8. In this analysis, a pattern emerges once again, one that appears to be directly applicable to conditions in the Sahel.
The Collier and Hoeffler framework is most definitely accessible to almost all international instances of civil unrest with threat of conflict. It could certainly be useful for a dissection of the dissatisfaction that developed in northern Mali in the early 2010’s and for explaining the subsequent violence of 2012-13. However, this is an endeavor unto itself and based on the scope of the New York Times article, an analysis of the ongoing nature of instability in the Sahel is more pressing. Groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS) and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM), exemplify the role of financing availability as a motivating factor in the decision to engage in civil conflict9, 10. Mali is unique in that slavery is still relatively common within its borders. This stems from its former role as a significant producer of natural resources for France and other colonial powers. This precedent remained and it is estimated that nearly 200,000 individuals are currently held captive as slaves across the country11. Many of the Islamist groups operating after the Tuareg rebellion saw this precedent as an opportunity for profit, sustaining their budgets by kidnapping and human trafficking, with JNIM specifically receiving funds from al-Shabab and Boko Haram12. Economic downturn in the late 2000s, paired with disparate communities in the northern and eastern regions of the country allowed these Islamist organizations to take full advantage of the combined power vacuum and opportunity of criminal enterprise.
It appears that both French and American strategy in the Sahel has neglected to consider a number of these highly consequential conditions. France, making similar mistakes to the U.S. in our initial incursion in Afghanistan, has prioritized the effectuation of tactical military success above the identification of comprehensive, attainable and long-term strategic interests. This transition is long overdue. While legitimate military capability and presence is an essential part of this shift—lending credence to a nation’s words—a clear definition of authority, followed by the development of national transportation infrastructure, more accessible educational systems and centrally provided employment opportunities would go farther than the continued patterns of the past eight years. Maclean provides a commentary and Collier presents a framework for inquiry. Together, these perspectives create a powerful lens through which to view the state of the Sahel in 2020.
1. Maclean, Ruth, and Finbarr O’reilly. “Crisis in the Sahel Becoming France’s Forever War.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 Mar. 2020, http://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/world/africa/france-sahel-west-africa-.html.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Collier, Paul. “The Market for Civil War.” Foreign Policy, The Slate Group, 2 Nov. 2009,
foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/02/the-market-for-civil-war/. p. 44
6. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56, no. 4, 2004, pp. 563–595., doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.7
7. Ibid, 45.
8. Ibid, 588-589.
9. Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.” FSI, Stanford University,
2018, cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state-greater-sahara.
10. Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen.” FSI, Stanford University, 2018, cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wal-muslimeen#highlight_text_822
11. MacInnes-Rae, Rick. “Al-Qaeda Complicating Anti-Slavery Drive in Mali.” CBC News, CBC/Radio Canada, 26 Nov. 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/al-qaeda-complicating-anti-slavery-drive-in-mali-1.1150057.
12. Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 March 2015. Web. 21 Oct. 2015.
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